CHINA-NIGERIA ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A REVIEW

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Abstract: *Like most bilateral relations***,** *China-Nigeria relations dated back to 1971 when the diplomatic relationship in politics, trade, investment, aid, technical, scientific, cultural, education, health, and the military was established. However, with the magnitude and duration of their relations, most of the existing studies focus on China-Africa. Also, it is observed that due to limited empirical studies and data limitations, many of the views on China-Nigeria relations lack evidence. Instead, conjectures have become strong both in academia and among the media, thereby leading to misleading reports. On this premise, this study made a conscious effort to review several important studies on China-Nigeria relations from 1972 to 2015. Specifically, the study attempted to profile Nigeria and make a comparative view of the China-Nigeria economy to furnish the readers with the details of their economic relations. The materials used for the review are Newspapers, secondary data from World Bank Development Indicators and other relevant literature on China-Africa/China-Nigeria. From the review, it is observed that oil and minerals endowment in Nigeria strengthens its relationship with China more than construction and manufacturing. Therefore, this study concludes that the Nigerian government and other concerned stakeholders should on leverage China's interest to develop the nation and improve economic growth.*

Keynote: China, Nigeria, Trade, FDI, Oil

BACKGROUND OF CHINA-NIGERIA RELATIONS

So many decades ago, before the creation of the formal Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) and the present Africa Union (AU), China established relations with Africa (Olofin et al., 2014). Thus, after China's independence in 1947, its relations with Africa began after the Bandung Indonesian conference in 1955 in which China initiated ties and offered economic, technical, and military support to African countries and liberation movements to unite with them against colonisation by the West (Renard, 2011; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011). Like that of most African countries, China-Nigeria relations included politics, trade, investment, aid, technical, scientific, cultural, education, health, and military (Ogunkola et al., 2008; Taylor, 2007; Gold et al., 2017; Gold & Devadason, 2018). Using the diplomatic agreement as to the benchmark, China-Nigeria relations dated back to February 10, 1971, when the diplomatic relationship was established (Gold, et al., 2015; Ogunkola et al., 2008). Coincidentally, on November 25th of the same year, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) officially replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations and in the UN Security Council against strong opposition from the USA to recognise Beijing's 21 years clamour for global recognition as one true government of China (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). This feat was achieved with the help of Nigeria, and other African, Latin American and Asia countries. Aside from limited exchanges, China and Nigeria's diplomatic relations were minimal for about 30 years. Nigeria, all through the time, had military regimes and unstable polity, while China was metamorphosing economically (Egbula & Zheng, 2011).

However, the late Nigerian military head of state from 1993 to 1998; General Sani Abacha re-initiated contact with the Chinese government and founded the Nigerian Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1994, but this was short-lived. Thus, owing to democratically elected Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2007, China-Nigeria relations blossomed. The period helps to develop and strengthened Sino-Nigeria relations (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). This is further exemplified by the exchange of visits at the highest political level [1] followed by signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) and various agreements[2]. Subsequently, in signifying the importance of Nigeria amongst other African countries to China, Nigeria was the first to sign a Strategic Partnership Memorandum of Understanding in January 2006. Also, China's Southern Airlines Company (CSAC) scheduled its first direct flight from Beijing to Lagos via Dubai on 31 December 2006; and hosted the first Chinese newspaper, officially issued in August 2005 (Taylor, 2007). Another agreement was on the establishment of a China Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centre in Nigeria and a Nigeria Trade Office in China, also founded in 2006 was the intergovernmental Nigeria-China Investment Forum (Oyeranti et al., 2009).

Furthermore, China in 2006 started building the maiden overseas Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Lagos, Nigeria to provide about 300 000 employment opportunities for Nigeria and encourage the local manufacturer to export to North America and Europe (Taylor, 2007). Under the leadership of President Obasanjo, China-Nigeria relations blossomed in this period because of the 'oil-for-infrastructure' development approach in which oil contracts is awarded to China in exchange for infrastructure (Gold et al., 2017). The 'oil-for-infrastructure' development approach was borne out of the need to provide Nigeria with infrastructures that are grossly lacking. However, this President Obasanjo's developmental approach with China was truncated in 2007 as the new Nigerian President; late Umaru Yar'Adua cancelled almost all the 'oil-for-infrastructure development' contracts based on lack of transparency. Although the late President Yar'Adua visited China in 2008, the progress achieved in China-Nigeria relations until his demise in May 2010 was less (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). Hence, the former Nigerian President Jonathan Goodluck who was the Vice President of late Umaru Yar'Adua rekindles the China-Nigeria relations upon his assumption of office in 2010 (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). And this prompted China to declare renewed strategic partnership with Nigeria.

To Egbula & Zheng (2011), Sino-Nigeria relations blossom to the extent that the 2011 general election materials were made in China. Subsequently, the Minister of Railways Sheng Guangzu was sent by the China president to attend President Jonathan's inauguration in May 2011. Furthermore, President Jonathan Goodluck increased mutual and economic relations by involving China in infrastructural improvements; soliciting China's help in the implementation of his industrialisation programme; as well as in the all-around economic development of Nigeria till May 28, 2015, his last days in office. In the history of the new democratic Nigeria, May 29 is significant as its ushers in a new president. Thus, on March 28, 2015, Jonathan lost an election to Muhammadu Buhari. Subsequently, on the 25th of April 2015, the Chinese ambassador, Mr Gu Kiaojie, in consonant with the established practice of paying a courtesy visit to new leaders, presented a prototype of a high-speed rail project intended to build for Nigeria to the president-elect Muhammadu Buhari in Abuja (The Nation April 22, 2015; Information Nigeria April 24, 2015, online). With the visit, positive speculation has it that Muhammadu Buhari will consolidate on Sino-Nigeria relations built over past years (This day August 2015).

NIGERIA AND CHINA: A COMPARATIVE VIEW

The China-Nigeria relationship pattern is far from being equal in all ramifications. China is an upper-middle-income country with about 1.37 billion population in 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). Its population surpasses that of the entire African continent of about 1.113 billion in 2014. Similarly, Nigeria's population also increased from 122.87 million people in 2000 to about 177.75 million people in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). However, the World Development Indicators (2014) show that China's population growth rate is below the rate of

[1]The engagement between China and Nigeria were complimented by the periodic visits of both Chinese and Nigeria leaders.
[2] See Gold et al. (2017); Gold and Devedason (2018) for the list of MoUs signed from 1992 to 2012.

Nigeria. For instance, China's population annual growth rate in 1988 was 1.36%, which declined to about 0.59% in 2005 and a further decline of 0.49% in 2012. Nigeria's population also had reduced from a 2.9% annual growth rate in 1988 to about 2.17% in 2005 but had an increase of 2.8% in 2012. While Nigeria has also attempted to reduce its population growth rate, there is still more to be done to achieve the desired level of development. In terms of GDP, China rose from about $300 billion in 1998 to over $8.229 trillion in 2012 well above Nigeria's GDP of $22.8 billion in 1998 and $463.4 billion in 2012.

The structure of the two economies and their trends over time also shows that China has gradually reduced the agriculture value added to its GDP over time from about 26% in 1988 to about 10% in 2012. Nigeria was able to reduce the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP from about 41% in 1988 to about 22% in 2012. In China, services contributed between a third and two-fifths to the GDP for the period under review. The contribution of the sector increased steadily from about 30% in 1988 to about 45% in 2012. In the case of Nigeria, the contribution of the services sector was bumpy, as it declined from about 26% in 1988 to 20% in 2005 but rose to 54% in 2012 to contribute more than half of the GDP. Perhaps the major difference between the two economies lies in the fact that the contribution of the industrial sector in Nigeria is not only fluctuating but also diminishing: from over 50% contribution to GDP in 2000, 30% in 2002 to barely over 20% in 2012.

The sector contribution was less than half of what it used to contribute to the GDP of the country a decade ago. It is not comparable to the manufacturing sector in China which maintained a steady contribution of between 45% and 47% to the GDP. Thus, the extractive industry's contribution to China's GDP was consistently between 10 and 15%, while it ranged from about 20% to unstable 50% in Nigeria. Hence the observed fluctuations are because of the Nigerian economy that is dominated by crude oil and the developments in the international price of the oil. On the other hand, China's reform was successful due to its supportive culture and emphasis on education. Also, a significant poverty reduction helped China's economic growth. China has been able to reduce the poverty headcount ratio of people living below $2 and $1.5 daily at the rate of about 66.2% to 23.1% and 37.3% to 9.1% per year from 1996 to 2010 respectively; compared with 86.5% to 82.2% and 68.7% to 62% in Nigeria.

CHANNELS AND OVERVIEW OF ISSUES IN CHINA-NIGERIA RELATIONS

The channel through which China impacts Nigeria suggests trade and investment as the main channels in most literature. Other channels are through funding aid/technical assistance/debt; environmental spill-over; institution of global governance and movement of people (migration). These channels complement each other in terms of China's goal (Renard, 2011) in their relationship with Africa and Nigeria. Furthermore, the growing and diverse relationship between China and Nigeria have been accompanied by a wave of economic migration to Nigeria by state-influenced construction teams, mining, and oil workers, as well as private traders (Broadman, 2008; Ogunkola et al., 2008). Immigration and emigration of Nigerians and Chinese have been limited by social-cultural factors, especially language barriers. Hence, in this study migration is treated within the trade-investment channels. Similarly, other issues such as environmental spill-over and institution of global governance are sub summed under the three main pillars. It should be noted, however, that cooperation (technical as well as financial) was the oldest form of engagement between China and Nigeria. Indeed, China's Africa Policy re-affirmed older principles of cooperation but added trade and investment as the basis for engagement. In the case of China-Nigeria trade, the period of their renewed engagement from 2000 to 2006 witnessed an increase in China's exports to Nigeria. Although, Nigeria's exports increase as shown in Figures 1a and 1b but are skewed towards the extractive industry. While China is in the manufacturing industry.





Figures 1a and 1b: Composition of China-Nigeria's Trade (1992-2013)
Source: *Authors' computation from UMComtrade (2016).*

In the three categories, agriculture had a small share of 2.9% and 1.9% as exports for China and Nigeria. Manufacturing imports to China from Nigeria were 23.5% from 1992 to 2013, while China exports 87.1% of its manufactures in return to Nigeria. However, during the period under review, the third category, minerals, the engine of Nigeria's economy shows surpluses and deficits in different years. From 1992 to 1994, the cumulative percentage was 0.08, and the deficit was recorded. In 1995, mineral exports to China increased by 94 per cent above the 1992-1994 estimates. This period coincides with when China became a net oil importer[3]. Subsequently, in 1997 demand for minerals declined to less than 1 per cent due to unstable Nigerian polity (Egbula & Zheng, 2011). Thus, the minerals import's structure was relatively stable but in 2006, dropped significantly to less than 1 per cent. In the preceding year (2007) China's import of minerals was the highest, at the end of 2013, China's imports of minerals stood at about 75 per cent.

In 2013, Nigeria's had 6% of China's trade with the continent (UMComtrade, 2016). In the China-Nigeria economic relations, trade balances are in favour of China, as reflected in Figure 2. Similarly, China recorded a US$10,486 million total surplus in trade with Nigeria in 2013 (Gold et al., 2017).

Investment Flows

In Africa, Nigeria is the third largest investment destination and has been consistently receiving FDI in the past decades both from the West and China. Due to her natural resource base and large market size, Nigeria ranked third behind Mozambique and South Africa in terms of flows in 2013, as against its first position in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2017). Thus, Table 1 shows Africa's top recipient of China's FDI flows and stock in the period 2001-2012[4]; total flows amount to US$17609.31 billion, and total stocks are US$ 78 157 billion. Nigeria's share in the total African FDI amounts to 5.3 per cent on average. At the end of 2012, China's stock in Nigeria is estimated to be 9 per cent, and the share of the oil and gas sector was about 75 per cent (UNCTAD FDI/TNC, 2017).

[3] Alden (2005); Hanson (2008) for details.

[4] The Chinese Ministry of Commerce is yet to release data for 2013, therefore, 2000-2012 data is used.

***Figure 2**: China-Nigeria Trade Flows, 1992-2013 (USD million)*
***Source**: Authors' computation from UMComtrade (2016).*

Table 1: Top China FDI outflows in Africa (US$ millions)

Region/ Country	2001-2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total 2001-2012
Algeria	2.47	11.21	84.87	98.93	145.92	42.25	228.76	186	114.34	245.88	1160.63
Egypt	2.1	5.72	13.31	8.85	24.98	14.57	133.86	51.65	66.45	119.41	44
Sudan	0	146.7	91.13	50.79	65.4	-63.14	19.3	30.96	911.86	-1.69	1251.31
Angola	0	0	0	22.39	41.19	-9.57	8.31	101.11	72.72	392.08	628.23
Congo, DR	0	11.91	5.07	36.73	57.27	23.99	227.16	236.19	75.18	344.17	1017.67
Mauritius	10.27	0	2.04	16.59	15.58	34.44	14.12	22.01	419.46	57.83	592.34
Nigeria	**24.4**	**45.52**	**53.3**	**67.79**	**390.35**	**162.56**	**171.86**	**184.89**	**197.42**	**333.05**	**1631.14**
South Africa	8.86	17.81	47.47	40.74	454.41	4807.86	41.59	411.17	-14.17	-814.91	5000.83
Zambia	5.53	2.23	10.09	87.44	119.34	213.97	111.8	75.05	291.78	291.55	1208.78
Zimbabwe	0	0.71	1.47	3.42	12.57	-0.72	11.24	33.8	440.03	287.47	789.99
Africa	**74.8**	**317.4**	**391.7**	**519.9**	**1574.3**	**5490.6**	**1438.9**	**2111.9**	**3173.1**	**2516.7**	**17609.3**

Source: Authors' compilation from UNCTAD FDI/TNC (2017).

In Figures 3a and 3b, FDI flow and stock from China to Nigeria increases specifically during the global financial crisis period. China's FDI flows were US$390 million in 2007 and US$1631.14 billion in 2008, while FDI stocks total $7446 billion in 2012.





Figures 3a and 3b: China FDI Stock and Outflows to Nigeria (2001-2012)
Source: *Computed from UNCTAD FDI/TNC (2017).*

The pattern of the FDI inflows from China to Nigeria is often skewed toward extractive industries (Ogunkola et al., 2008, Alabi et al., 2011, Taylor 2007, 2014), largely from SOEs driven by the state's interest in the minerals and oil sectors (Table 2). Even though, the size of the local market also serves as consideration for attracting investment (Asiedu, 2002, Ayanwale, 2007; Alabi et al., 2011). In addition, Chinese FDI to Africa shows a significant increase, although, FDI flows, and stocks attracted by Nigeria are marginal to other recipients of China's FDI in Africa considering the available resource and potential needs (Asiedu, 2006). Despite this, Chinese investments in Nigeria's extractive industry continue. While China's SOEs are seeking investment opportunities in construction and other services in Nigeria (Gold et al., 2017).

Table 2: Chinese Investments in Nigeria's Oil and Mineral Sectors (US$ million)

Year	Investor	US $ millions	Share Size	Partner/Target	Sector
2006 (January)	CNOOC	2270	45%	South African Petroleum	Energy
2006 (May)	China Energy Engineering	110			Energy
2008 (November)	Shenzhen Energy	2400		First Bank, Nigeria	Energy (Gas)
2012 (September)	China Power Investment	130			Energy
2012 (November)	Sinopec	2500	20%	Total	Energy (Oil)
2013 (May)	Power Construction Corp. and Sinomach	1290			Energy (Hydro)
2013 (July)	Sinomach	420		Eurafric	Energy
2013 (July)	Sinomach	200			Energy

Source: China Global Investment Tracker (2015).

CHINA'S DEMAND FOR OIL AND MINERALS

Chinese oil multinational cooperation (MNCs) has been investing in oil production around the world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa partly for security reasons[5], to sustain its growth, and to diversify its sources of energy away from the Middle East, (Gold, et al. 2019, Pegg 2012, Carmody & Owusu, 2007, Egbula & Zheng, 2011; Obi, 2008; Alden & Davies, 2006). At present, 30 per cent of China's energy is derived from Africa (Kelly 2012; Egbula & Zheng, 2011; Obi 2008). This figure translates to the fact that China's import from Africa is 70 per cent crude oil base, while 15 per cent is from other minerals resources like copper, bauxite,

[5] See Down (2007); Gold et al. (2019) for details of China's energy demand and energy security.

uranium, aluminum, manganese, and iron ore, among others, (Kolstad & Wiig 2011; Kelly, 2012; Taylor, 2006). Also, Beijing's particular interest in copper increased the price from $1319 per ton in 2001 to $8800 in 2006 (Carmody & Owusu 2007). China's major imports and the largest share of Chinese FDI in Africa are in the extractive industries (Biggeri & Sanfilippo 2009; Alabi et al., 2011; Hanson, 2008; Anyu & Ifedi, 2008; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Pegg, 2012; Carmody & Owusu, 2007). In which in 2013, Nigeria, Angola, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria produced 75 per cent of the African crude oil (IEA, 2016).

Against this backdrop, China's exports and investment in crude oil and minerals from Nigeria and other resource endowed countries in Africa (Alabi et al., 2011; Anyu & Ifedi 2008; Alden & Davies, 2006) to secure energy. The peculiarity of Nigeria is because of its large oil field reserves and other 44 exploitable minerals available in commercial quantities (NIPC, 2015). The Chinese bilateral trade and investment spectrum in Nigeria differs from that of other African countries. This is because; *"Nigeria is the second-largest Chinese exports market behind South Africa"* (Gold et al., 2017). Contrarily, Nigeria also exports about 80 per cent of crude oil and other minerals to China (UNComtrade, 2016).

ENGAGEMENT OF CHINA IN NIGERIAN OIL AND MINERALS SECTORS

China came into Nigeria's oil and mining through powerful diplomacy and deal by launching the Nigerian satellite in 2007 (Taylor, 2007, 2014). As a result of the nature of exports and imports to and from Nigeria, that is, China's energy demands (Pegg, 2012), and Nigeria's proven oil reserves and minerals (NIPC, 2015). The Chinese officials frequently point out the "complementarities" between China and Nigeria's engagement (China Daily 2015; Alabi et al., 2011). Besides, Nigeria needs cash to fund its development agenda, while China holds approximately USD 3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves (Renard, 2011). Correspondingly, both nations, Beijing says, are developing countries with an opportunity to achieve strong growth (China Daily, 2015; Alabi et al., 2011).

Furthermore, China's interest in Nigerian oil, became more prominent when Nigeria began to experience stable polity in 1999 (Egbula & Zheng, 2011) when former President Obasanjo seek for the Chinese 'oil-for-infrastructure model' used in Angola (Bing & Ceccoli, 2013). Subsequently, the exchange of infrastructural development for concessions on resources blossom as Chinese companies secured oil blocs during his 1999-2007 regime (Egbula & Zheng, 2011; Mthembu-Salter, 2009; Alabi et al., 2011). In exchange, the Chinese government assist to improve infrastructure projects, forgiving debts and giving loans and grants which is beneficial to Nigeria (Quigley, 2014; Egbula & Zheng, 2011). Given Nigeria's need for infrastructure, China's oil-for-infrastructure model was seen as a welcome development (Alabi et al., 2011; Taylor, 2006). In return for the four oil blocs in 2006, China is to invest $2 billion to rehabilitate the Kaduna oil refinery, build a hydroelectric power station in Mambilla, and provide a $2.5 billion Eximbank loan to construct a railway from Lagos to Kano (Mthembu-Salter, 2009; AidData, 2015; Downs 2007).

However, this was short-lived due to a change in government in 2007 when late President Ya'radua revokes the deals sighting lack of transparency as the basis (Egbula & Zheng 2011). In contrast, Mthembu-Salter (2009) state that the main reason for disrupting oil-for infrastructure is because the rent-seeking nation, most especially the Nigerian political elites will rather take cash for oil blocs, and they will delay infrastructure projects for their benefits. For instance, China's CNPC planned investment in the Kaduna refinery was jettison as a 51% stake in the refinery was sold to Bluestar Oil Company owned by former president Obasanjo's ally before leaving office (Gold et al., 2017). Contrarily, the Bureau of Public Enterprise Director-General, Irene Chigbue, stated that China is not meeting up to expectations and "had run into hitches as CNOOC have not been forthcoming with the takeover plans" of the Kaduna refinery (Taylor, 2014). Consequently, China exchanges minerals and oil for cash, as against the oil-for-infrastructure arrangement (Mthembu-Salter 2009).

By and large, the oil-for-infrastructure agreement between China and Nigeria failed majorly because of the few political elites who prefer cash and want to benefit from the agreement, and the lack of transparency on the part of the Nigerian government especially as most of the intended infrastructure costs was inflated (Taylor, 2014). Hence, the suspension of the oil-for-infrastructure agreement affected China's exposure to the Nigerian oil sector and signals China to purchase reserves rather than offer to finance and construct national infrastructure to gain access to Nigerian oil (Mthembu-Salter, 2009).

However, before the oil blocs and license that was revoked in 2007, China's MNCs signed other agreements with the Nigerian government in 2004 to develop oil mining lease (OML) 64 and 66 (Taylor, 2007, 2014). As well, there is another signed agreement of $800 million to buy 30 thousand barrels of crude oil daily for five years; Payment of $2.27 billion to acquire 45% of OML 130 which is the largest global China acquisition (Anyu & Ifedi 2008; Hurst, 2006; Taylor, 2007, 2014; Downs, 2007; Alden & Davies 2006; Gold et al., 2017). Additionally, following China's President Hu Jintao's visit to Nigeria, CNPC benefited from Nigeria's sale of four oil blocks (two in the Chad Basin and two in the Niger-Delta) in April 2006 (Obi, 2008; Gold et al., 2017; Gold & Devadason, 2018[6]). Furthermore, in the minerals sector, China has been investing in iron, ore, copper, and other minerals (Alden, 2005; Anyu & Ifedi, 2008; Kragelung, 2009; Carmody & Owusu, 2007). As stated in Gold and Devadason (2018) …

> China is working hard to make headway and leverage in areas where they have a more competitive advantage and offer something different from its Western counterparts. Even though Chinese engagement in the extractive industry is late, its modus operandi is similar in many ways when compared to the other established MNCs investors operating in Africa. Along this line, the Chinese MNEs in Nigeria are willing to take more risks and pay higher to secure oil and minerals than their Western counterparts (p.1035-1036).

Also, CNOOC acquisitions of Nigeria's Akpo offshore oil and gas field in 2006, in which a quarter of a billion dollars was offered over and above that of India Oil Company (Kelly, 2012). While this is regarded as a success by the Chinese, while the international competitors and NGOs view China's investment approach in oil and minerals sectors as 'unfair practices' because of the bribes and bonuses China gives to acquire oil and minerals fields (Anyu & Ifedi, 2008). Particularly because the MNC connives with political elites, the Niger-Delta oil region is facing serious environmental, security and socioeconomic problems (Anyu & Ifedi, 2008). These issues lead to the uprise of the militia that abducts foreign oil workers (Taylor, 2007). Further, Alabi et al., (2011), argue that China's oil workers and their Western counterparts are not spared from the militia demanding a cleaner environment and resource distribution. This agitation led to the kidnapped of several foreign oil workers (Pegg, 2012), including several Chinese workers in the oil-producing region particularly in 2007 (Thisday 5 February in Taylor, 2007; Hilsum, 2008).

Although, the overall size of China's MNCs mergers and acquisitions is modest in Nigeria as against the alleged Western oil investors that are not meeting up to expectations (Kragelund, 2009; Anyu & Ifedi 2008; Pegg, 2012; Downs, 2007). Therefore, evaluating the longer-term consequences of the increased Chinese presence in the extractive sector in sub-Saharan Africa will be too soon (Pegg, 2012). Besides, some of the analysis and argumentation developed on Chinese oil companies could also apply to other Chinese mining companies operating in Nigeria. Such relevance would, however, must be demonstrated empirically.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, a systematic review of China's rapidly growing economic relations with Africa vis-à-vis Nigeria in trade, FDI, economic cooperation, mining, and oil sectors are accessed. It is worth mentioning that while China-Nigeria relations may be too soon to measure considering the period of engagement especially when the benefits and the duration in Nigeria are compared with the Western partners. One would not fail to observe that Sino-Nigeria studies have focused mainly on aggregate trade and investment while China's impacts, internal processes steps in transferring technology through its SOEs investment in Nigerian oil and mining sectors, the volume of investment in the extractive industry and the effects on the environment, the success or failure of its efforts have never been

[6] See Gold and Devadason (2018) for the detail assessment of China's engagement in Nigeria's oil sector.

conceptualized in most of the existing literature. In addition, the controversy surrounding the flow of people, especially labour needs rigorous research. Furthermore, the impacts of Sino-Nigeria relations on the socioeconomic well being of the host communities researched from in-depth, microeconomic country and sector-specific will be the focus of this research.

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